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ABSTRACT
We estimate the elasticity of exports to credit using matched customs and firm-level bank credit data
from Peru. To account for non-credit determinants of exports, we compare changes in exports of the
same product and to the same destination by firms borrowing from banks differentially affected by
capital flow reversals during the 2008 financial crisis. We obtain elasticity estimates for the intensive
and extensive margins of exports, size and frequency of shipments, and the method of freight and payment.
Our results suggest that the credit shortage reduces exports through raising the cost of working capital
for general production, rather than the cost of financing export-specific cash cycles or sunk entry investments.
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The role of banks in the amplication of real economic uctuations has been debated by
policymakers and academics since the Great Depression (Friedman and Schwarz (1963),
Bernanke (1983)). The basic premise is that funding shocks to banks during economic
downturns increase the real cost of nancial intermediation and reduce borrowers access
to credit and output. Through this channel, international commercial banks have been
shown to represent an important source of contagion during periods of international capital
reversals.1 Although there is now a large body of evidence suggesting that negative bank
credit shocks may aect economic activity, the magnitude of the sensitivity of output
to credit shortages is unknown, and the underlying economic mechanisms behind this
sensitivity are less understood.2
In this paper we study empirically the impact of bank credit shortages on economic
activity using disaggregated rm export data. Measuring rm output with disaggregated
export data allows us to dissect the eect of credit on economic activity along three novel
dimensions. First, we can empirically decompose the eect of credit on output into the
credit supply shock and the sensitivity of exports to credit uctuations. In doing so,
we provide the rst estimates of a rm's elasticity of output to credit, a key input for
parameterizing quantitative analysis. Second, customs data at the shipment level allows
us to decompose the export elasticity to credit in its intensive and extensive margins,
as well as measuring the elasticity of other dimensions of the export activity (shipment
size and frequency, freight and payment method). Third, we can analyze how the export
elasticity to credit varies across rms, product and export ow characteristics. These
decompositions provide insights into the channel through which credit uctuations aect
exports and output.3
1See Schnabl (2010), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010), Puri, Rocholl and Steen (2011), and IMF (2009).
2For early evidence see, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994),
Kashyap and Stein (2000), Peek and Rosengren (2000), and Ashcraft (2005).
3Progress along these dimensions in the literature that studies the eect of nancial shocks on trade
2We study the export behavior of Peruvian rms during the 2008 nancial crisis. The
funding of banks operating in Peru was negatively aected by the reversal of capital ows
during the crisis. We use this funding shortage, which was particularly pronounced among
banks with a high share of foreign liabilities, as a source of variation for the supply of credit
to their related rms. To overcome concerns that unobserved demand and input market
shocks might be correlated with the credit supply shock, we rely on the disaggregated
nature of our data to account for these non-credit shocks: We compare the export growth
of the same product and to the same destination of rms that borrow from banks that
were subject to these heterogeneous funding shocks.
To illustrate the intuition behind this approach consider, for example, two rms that
export Men's Cotton Overcoats to the U.S.4 Suppose that one of the rms obtains all its
credit from Bank A, which had a large funding shock, while the other rm obtains its
credit from Bank B, which did not. Changes in the demand for overcoats in the U.S., or
changes in the nancial condition of coat importers in the U.S. should, in expectation,
aect exports by both rms in a similar way. Also, any real shock to the production of
overcoats in Peru, e.g. changes in the price of cotton or wage uctuation in the garment
industry, should aect both rms' exports the same way. Thus, the change in export
performance in a product-destination of a rm that borrows from Bank A relative to
a rm that borrows from Bank B isolates the eect of credit on exports. We use an
instrumental variable approach based on this intuition to estimate the credit elasticity of
exports.
We start by showing that banks that rely heavily on foreign funding before the nancial
crisis reduced signicantly the supply of credit when capital ows reversed during 2008.
has been limited by the use of export data aggregated at the sector-destination level or the rm level,
and/or the unavailability of bank credit information. See, for example, Amiti and Weinstein (2009),
Bricongne, Fontagne, Gaulier, Taglioni and Vicard (2009), Iacovone and Zavacka (2009), and Chor and
Manova (2010).
4The example coincides with the 6-digit product aggregation in the Harmonized System, used in the
paper.
3We demonstrate, using the within-rm estimator from recent work on the lending channel,
that the supply of credit by banks with above average share of foreign liabilities declined
by 17% after July 2008.5 Consistent with the hypothesis that the credit supply decline was
caused by the foreign funding shortage, the entire credit supply decline occurs through
foreign currency denominated loans.
Our results on the credit elasticity of exports are as follows. On the intensive margin,
we nd that a 10% reduction in the supply of credit results in a contraction of 2.3% in the
(one year) volume of export ows for those rm-product-destination ows active before
and after the crisis. This elasticity does not vary with the size of the export ow. On
the extensive margin, a negative credit supply shock reduces the number of rms that
continue exporting to a given market, with an elasticity of 0.36. This eect is particularly
important for small export ows: a 10% decline in the supply of credit reduces the number
of rms exporting to a product-destination by 5.4%, if the initial export ow volume was
below the median. However, the credit shock does not signicantly aect the number of
rms entering an export market.
The estimated intensive and extensive margin elasticities provide new insights on the
relationship between exporters' production function and their use of credit. Consider, for
example, the benchmark model of trade with sunk entry costs.6 In such a framework,
a negative credit shock aects the entry margin, but once the initial investment is paid,
credit uctuations do not aect the intensive margin of trade or the probability of exiting
an export market. Yet, we nd positive elasticities both in the intensive and continuation
margins, suggesting that credit shocks aect the variable cost of exporting. This would
5For applications of within-rm estimators in banking see, for example, Gan (2007), Khwaja and Mian
(2008), Paravisini (2008), Iyer, Lopes, Peydro and Schoar (2010), Iyer and Peydro (2010), Schnabl (2010),
Jimenez, Mian, Peydro and Saurina (2011a) and Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro and Saurina (2011b).
6See, among others, Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Roberts and Tybout (1999), and Melitz (2003).
Motivated by the important xed costs involved in entering a new market|i.e. setting up distribution
networks, marketing{ Chaney (2005) develops a model where rms are liquidity constrained and must
pay an export entry cost. Participation in the export market is, as a result, suboptimal.
4be the case, for example, if banks nanced exporters' working capital, as in Feenstra,
Li and Yu (2011). By increasing the unit cost of production, adverse credit conditions
reduce the equilibrium size and protability of exports. In combination with xed costs,
the protability decline induces rms to discontinue small export ows, which are close
to the break-even point.
We further characterize the nature of the xed cost of exporting by analyzing how
credit supply alters rms' freight practices. After a credit shock, rms adjust the inten-
sive margin of exports by changing the frequency of shipments of a given product to a
given destination (with elasticity 0.14), while keeping the volume size of the shipment
constant. This suggests the existence of a xed cost of exporting at the shipment level.
The transportation method chosen by the exporter is also elastic to credit: rms are less
likely to ship by air after a negative credit shock. On the other hand, a credit shock to
the exporter is not found to alter the credit conditions agreed in the trade contract (i.e.,
the fraction of the contract paid in advanced by the importer).
To explore whether our results are specic to the role of credit in export activities,
we measure the heterogeneity of the estimated elasticity across destinations, transport
means, and the importer's method of payment. These dimensions have been suggested
to increase the sensitivity of exports to credit beyond that of domestic sales: distance
to markets, longer freight times, and delay in international payments imply longer cash
cycles and higher working capital needs.7 If export-related working capital needs represent
a large fraction of the overall working capital of the rm, these factors would result in
a higher export sensitivity to a credit shortage. We nd, however, that the elasticity
of exports to credit does not vary in the cross section with distance to the destination
market, freight speed (ground and sea versus air), or the payment method (cash versus
7See Hummels (2001), Auboin (2009), Amiti and Weinstein (2009), Antras and Foley (2011), and
Doing Business by the World Bank for suggestive evidence and Ahn (2010), Feenstra et al. (2011), and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2010) for related theory.
5credit). This suggests that the observed sensitivities do not result from changes in the
cost of funding working capital that is specic to the exporting activity. Instead, the
results suggest that the computed elasticity of exports to nance results from the cost
of funding the rm's requirements of working capital for production, irrespectively of the
market of destination.
Our estimates correspond to the elasticity of exports to short-run credit uctuations.
We explore whether factors assumed in prior research to aect the sensitivity of exports to
long-term nancial conditions can predict the eect of short-term credit shocks. Among
other dimensions, we look at the heterogeneity of the elasticity across sectors that dier in
terms of their external nance dependence, as measured in Rajan and Zingales (1998).8
We nd that the elasticity of exports to credit shocks is constant across sectors with
dierent measure of external nance dependence. This result suggests that the elasticity
to long-term and short-term changes in nancial conditions reect dierent aspects of
the rm's use of credit. The former varies with the rm's technological requirements of
capital in sectors characterized by important entry costs or xed investments. The latter
is related to the funding of working capital. They are complementary parameters that
characterize the link between exports and credit.
We nd that accounting for the determinants of exports at the product-destination
level is necessary for obtaining an unbiased estimate of the magnitude of the credit shock
on output. The elasticities and overall impact of the credit shock on exports are overes-
timated by 65% to 95% when export demand and input price variations are unaccounted
for. This implies that rms and banks are not matched at random, but instead, banks
with a high share of foreign liabilities specialize in products and destination markets
disproportionately hit by non-credit factors during the 2008 international crisis.9
8For examples of research using the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure as a proxy for credit constraints
in trade see, for example, Beck (2003), Manova (2008), and Manova, Wei and Zhang (2009).
9Bank specialization is consistent with Olsen (2011), which proposes a model in which banks build
reputation in export markets through repeated interactions.
6The sizable magnitude of the bias emphasizes the importance of non-credit factors
during the great trade collapse.10 Indeed, in the case of Peru, our estimates suggest that
while bank credit appears to have a rst order eect on trade, the bulk of the decline in
the volume of exports during the analysis period is explained by the drop in international
demand for Peruvian goods. Peruvian exports volume growth was -9.6% during the year
following July 2008, almost 13 percentage points lower than the previous year. Assuming
that only banks with above average foreign liabilities to assets reduced their supply of
credit, the estimated elasticities imply that the credit supply decline accounts for about
15% of the missing volume of exports.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 shows the estimates of the export elastic-
ity to credit supply. Section 5 analyzes how the sensitivity of exports to credit shocks
varies according to observable characteristics of the export ow. Section 6 estimates the
importance of credit and non-credit factors in the estimation of the Peruvian exports
drop during the 2008 crisis. Section 7 performs identication and robustness tests on our
baseline estimation strategy. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Data Description
We use four data sets: bank level data on Peruvian banks, loan level data on credit in
the domestic banking sector, customs data for Peruvian rms, and information on rms'
country of ownership from Top Peru, a private data provider.
We collect the customs data from the website of the Peruvian tax agency (Superin-
tendence of Tax Administration, or SUNAT). Collecting the export data involves using a
web crawler to download each individual export document. To validate the consistency
10For evidence of non-nancial determinants of the 2008 trade collapse, see Alessandria, Kaboski and
Midrigan (2010), Bems, Johnson and Yi (2010), Eaton, Kortum, Neiman and Romalis (2010), and
Levchenko, Lewis and Tesar (2010).
7of the data collection process, we compare the sum of the monthly total exports from our
data, with the total monthly exports reported by the tax authority. On average, exports
from the collected data add up to 99.98% of the exports reported by SUNAT. We match
the loan data to export data using a unique rm identier assigned by SUNAT for tax
collection purposes.
The bank and credit data are from the Peruvian bank regulator, Superintendence of
Banking, Insurance, and Pension Funds (SBS). All data are public information. The
bank data consist of monthly nancial statements for all of Peru's commercial banks from
January 2007 to December 2009. Columns 1 to 3 in Table 1 provide descriptive statistics
for the 13 commercial banks operating in Peru during this period.11 The credit data are
a monthly panel of the outstanding debt of every rm with each bank operating in Peru.
Peruvian exports in 2009 totaled almost $27bn, approximately 20% of Peru's GDP.
North America and Asia are the main destinations of Peruvian exports; in particular
United States and China jointly account for approximately 30% of total ows. The main
exports are extractive activities: goods derived from gold and copper account for ap-
proximately 40% of Peruvian exports. Other important sectors are food products (coee,
asparagus, and sh) and textiles.
In the time series, Peruvian exports grew steadily over the last decade until the 2008
nancial crisis and suered a sharp drop after 2008. Figure 1 shows the monthly (log)
export ows between 2007 and 2009. Peak to trough, monthly exports dropped around
60% in value (40% in volume) during the 2008 nancial crisis. The timing and magnitude
of this decline aligns closely with the sharp collapse of world trade during the last quarter
of 2008.
Panel 1 in Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of Peruvian exporters. Our data cover
the universe of exporters, which are all rms with at least one export shipment registered
11Although included in the regressions, the statistics in Table 1 do not describe the Savings and Loans
institutions because their participation in lending to exporters is negligible.
8between July 2007 and June 2009. The descriptive statistics correspond to the period July
2007-June 2008, prior to the capital ow reversal caused by the 2008 crisis (next section
explains this timing choice in more detail). The average bank debt outstanding of the
universe of exporters as of December 2007 is $1.01 million and the average level of exports
is $3.3 million FOB (Free On Board). The average rm exports to 2.7 destinations, out
of a total of 198. The average rm exports 5.3 four-digit products (out of a total of 1,103
products with positive export ows in the data). Our empirical analysis in Section 4 is
based on exporting rms with positive debt in the domestic banking sector, both, before
and after the negative credit supply shock. As shown in Table 2, rms in this subsample
are larger than in the full sample. For example, average exports in the analysis sample is
$4.0 million, and average debt outstanding is $1.25 million.
The unit of observation in our baseline regressions is a rm-product-destination annual
export ow. Panel 2 in Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the universe of 53,690
export ows and for the 47,810 observations that correspond to our sample of exporters.
The average annual export ow in our sample is US$184,800 FOB (446,400 kg), and is
distributed into 2.17 shipments. Approximately a third of these export ows are paid in
advanced by the importer. A similar proportion is shipped by air, the rest is transported
by sea or ground. To estimate the eect of credit on the intensive margin of trade,
the sample is restricted to around 16,500 rm-product-destination export ows that are
positive (at least one shipment), both, in the period July 2007-June 2008 and July 2008-
June 2009, the years before and after the beginning of the capital ow reversal. The eect
on the extensive margin is estimated using all positive rm-product-destination export
ows.
In order to analyze how the sensitivity of exports to credit varies across multinational
and domestic, we combine the credit and export data with information from Top Peru, a
private data provider that publishes annual information on the 10,000 largest companies
9in Peru. For the largest 500 rms, Top Peru provides information on equity held by foreign
companies. We use the unique tax identier to merge our data to the 2004 Top Peru data
set and classify rm as multinational if at least 50% of the rm are foreign-owned. With
this classication, 4% of the rms in the analysis sample are foreign-owned aliates of a
multinational rm, which account for 9.2% of product-destination export ow (see Table
2).
3 Empirical Strategy
This section describes our approach to identifying the causal eect of nance on exports.
Consider the following general characterization of the level of exports by rm i of product
p to destination country d at time t, Xipdt.
Xipdt = Xipdt(Hipdt;Cit): (1)
The rst argument, Hipdt, represents determinants of exports other than nance, i.e.
demand for product p in country d, nancial conditions in country d, the cost of inputs
for producing product p, the productivity of rm i, etc. The second argument, Cit,
represents the amount of credit taken by the rm.




identication problem is that the amount of credit, Cit, is an equilibrium outcome that
depends on the supply of credit faced by the rm, Sit, and the rm's demand for credit,
which may be given by the same factors, Hipdt, aecting the level of exports:
Cit = Cit(Hipdt;:::;Sit): (2)
Our empirical strategy to address this problem is based on two pillars. First, we instru-
10ment for the supply of credit, using shocks to the balance sheet of the banks lending to
rm i. This empirical approach obtains unbiased parameters if banks and rms are ran-
domly matched. However, if banks specialize by rms' product or destination markets,
the instrument may be correlated to factors that aect exports though channels other
than the supply of credit. For example, suppose that banks suering a negative balance
sheet shock specialize in rms that export Men's Cotton Overcoats to the U.S. If the de-
mand for Men's Cotton Overcoats in the U.S. drops disproportionately during the crisis,
we would erroneously attribute this decline in exports to the credit supply shock.
To avoid potential bias due to non-random matching of rms and banks, a second pillar
of our empirical strategy involves controlling for all heterogeneity in the cross section with
rm-product-destination xed eects, and for shocks to the productivity and demand
of exports with product-country-time dummies.12 Instead of comparing total exports
across rms, our estimation compares exports within product-destinations. In the example
above, our estimation procedure compares the change in Men's Cotton Overcoat exports
to the U.S. by a rm that is linked to a negatively aected bank, relative to the change
in Men's Cotton Overcoat exports to the U.S. of a rm whose lender is not aected.
The identication assumption is that factors other than bank credit that may aect
the exports of mens' cotton overcoats to the U.S. dierentially across these two rms
during the crisis are not related to the banks the rms borrow from. This identication
assumption is much weaker than the parallel assumption at the rm-level. A violation of
this identication assumption would require, for example, that production stoppages due
to equipment breakdowns become more frequent during the crisis for rms that borrow
from banks with a high fraction of foreign liabilities.13 Such a correlation between bank
12Subsection 6.2 shows that the impact of the credit shock on export is severely overestimated if the
model does not control for heterogeneity of non-credit factors across product and destinations.
13Note that a negative credit supply shock may cause production stoppages, for example, due to
nancial distress. This does not invalidate our identifying assumptions; on the contrary, this type of
eect is precisely the one we are measuring.
11aliation and idiosyncratic shocks to exports of the same product and to the same des-
tination is unlikely. To corroborate this, we show in Section 7 that our point estimates
are unchanged when we allow the eect of credit to exports to vary across rms that ex-
port products of dierent quality, rms that have dierent currency composition of their
liabilities, single and multi-product rms, and small and large rms measured both by
volume of exports and by number of destinations.
Summarizing, we estimate , the elasticity of exports to credit, using the following
empirical model of exports:
ln(Xipdt) =   ln(Cit) + ipd + pdt + "ipdt; (3)
where, as in equation (1) above, Xipdt represents the exports by rm i of product p to
destination country d at time t and Cit is the the sum of all outstanding credit from the
banking sector to rm i at time t. The right-hand side includes two sets of dummy vari-
ables that account for the cross sectional unobserved heterogeneity of product p exported
to destination d by rm i, ipd, and the product-destination-time shocks, pdt. The rst
component captures, for example, the managerial ability of rm i, or the rm knowledge
of the market for product p in destination d. The second component captures changes
in the cost of production of good p, variations in the transport cost for product p to
destination d, or any uctuation in the demand for product p at destination d.
We estimate equation (3) using shocks to the nancial condition of the banks lending
to rm i as an instrument for the amount of credit received by rm i at time t, Cit.
We next explain the economic rationale behind the instrument, and further discuss the
identication hypothesis behind the instrumental variable (IV) estimation.
123.1 Capital Flow Reversals, Bank Foreign Liabilities and Credit
Supply
Portfolio capital inows to Peru, which were growing prior to the crisis, stopped suddenly
in mid 2008. Foreign funding to Peruvian banks exhibits the same evolution (see Figure
2). Although this reversal of the foreign funding trend characterizes all Peruvian nancial
institutions, there were dierences in the foreign funding dependence across banks before
the crisis.14 For example, the foreign liabilities of HSBC and Banco Santander, two large
foreign owned banks operating in Peru, were 17.7% and 2.2% of assets in 2006. The hy-
pothesis behind the instrumental variable approach is that banks with a larger fraction of
their funding from foreign sources reduce the supply of credit relative to other banks after
the capital ow reversal. In this section we test this identication assumption formally
using a within-rm estimation procedure to disentangle credit supply from changes in the
demand for credit.15
To do this, we rst rank banks according to their dependence on foreign liabilities in
2006, a year before the crisis. A bank b is considered to be exposed if the share of foreign
liabilities in its balance sheet is above the mean (9.5%). Of the thirteen commercial
bank in the sample, four are classied as exposed.16 Both groups of commercial banks
include local and foreign owned institutions. For example, in the example above, HSBC
is classied as exposed and Santander as not-exposed. The fraction of loans to exporting
rms by exposed and non-exposed commercial banks is 53.9% and 60.5% respectively. All
Savings and Loans Institutions are classied as not-exposed and lend almost exclusively
to individuals and non exporting small rms.
14See Banco Central de Reserva del Peru (2009) for an analysis of the performance of the domestic
nancial market during the 2008 crisis.
15This procedure has been used in Gan (2007), Khwaja and Mian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Iyer et al.
(2010), Iyer and Peydro (2010), Schnabl (2010), Jimenez et al. (2011a) and Jimenez et al. (2011b).
16The exposed banks are Citibank, Continental, HSBC, and MiBanco. Not exposed banks are Credito,
Comercio, Financiero, Interamericano, Interbank, Santander, Trabajo, and Wiese-Scotiabank.
13Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the two groups of commercial banks:
Banks with above-mean exposure to foreign borrowing and banks with below-mean expo-
sure to foreign borrowing as of December 2007. High foreign exposure banks are slightly
smaller than low foreign exposure banks with total assets of $2.5 billion relative to $2.8
billion. Both high and low foreign exposure banks have loans worth more than 60% of
assets and nance more than 50% of assets with retail deposits. By construction, the
main dierence between the two types of banks is that foreign nance represents 19.6%
of total liabilities for high exposure banks relative to 5% for low exposure banks.
The within-rm estimator entails comparing the change in the amount of lending by
banks with dierent dependence on foreign capital to the same rm, before and after the
capital ow reversal. Based on the evolution of total foreign lending to Peruvian banks
in Figure 2, we set July 2008 as the starting date for the capital reversals.17 This leads
to the following empirical model:
ln(Cibt) = ib + it +   FDb  Postt + ibt (4)
Cibt refers to average outstanding debt of rm i with bank b during the intervals t =
fPre;Postg, where the Pre and Post periods correspond to the 12 months before and
after July 2008. FDb is a dummy that takes value one for exposed banks and zero
otherwise, and Postt is a dummy equal to one when t = Post. The regression includes
rm-bank xed eects, ib, which control for all (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity
in the demand and supply of credit. It also includes a full set of rm-time dummies, it,
that control for the rm-specic evolution in overall credit demand during the period
under analysis. As long as changes in a rm's demand for credit are equally spread across
dierent lenders in expectation, the coecient  measures the change in credit supply by
17Section 7 shows that results are robust to setting the turning point in April 2008, after the collapse
of Bearn Stearns.
14banks with higher dependence on foreign funding.
We present in Table 3, column 1, the estimated parameters of specication (4), ob-
tained by rst-dierencing to eliminate the rm-bank xed eects, and allowing corre-
lation of the error term at the bank level in the standard error estimation. We nd
that, indeed, banks transmitted the international funding shock to rms. Banks with an
above-average share of foreign liabilities reduced lending by 17% relative to other banks,
after controlling for credit demand. Consistent with the hypothesis that the credit sup-
ply decline was driven by shortage in dollar funding, the decline is entirely explained
by the evolution of dollar denominated loans, which drop by more than 24% relative to
non-exposed banks (column 2). Local currency denominated loans, on the other hand,
increased by 16% relative to non-exposed banks (column 3) and partially oset the re-
duction in the supply of dollar denominated credit.
This implies that a bank's share of liabilities funded with foreign capital is a good pre-
dictor of the supply of bank credit after the capital ow reversals and conrms the main
identication assumption behind our instrumental variable approach. It is important to
emphasize that the identication assumption tested here, that the instrument be corre-
lated with the supply of credit, is much stronger than the typical necessary condition for
the IV estimation of equation (3), i.e. that the instrument be correlated with the amount
of credit. We present the rst stage regression of the instrument on credit in Section 4,
and show that this weaker necessary condition also holds.
Following the above discussion, in the baseline estimation of specication (3) we use
the following functional form for the instrumental variable
Fit = Fi  Postt; (5)
where the indicator function Fi is one if rm i borrows more than 50% from exposed
banks in 2006, and zero otherwise; Postt is an indicator variable that turns to one after
15July 2008, when the decline in foreign funding started. The cross sectional variation in
Fit comes from the amount of credit that rm i receives from exposed banks in 2006.
The classication of banks and rms in 2006 reduces the likelihood that bank foreign
dependence and rm-bank matching were endogenously chosen in anticipation of the
crisis. The time series variation in Fit is given by the aggregate decline of foreign liquidity
in the Peruvian economy. In robustness checks reported in Section 7, we also dene Fi as
the fraction of the rm's total debt that came from exposed banks in 2006.
4 Eect of Credit Supply Shock on Exports
In this section we use the methodology described above to estimate the elasticity of
exports to credit. We estimate separately the elasticity on the intensive and extensive
margins. Since our empirical strategy relies crucially on accounting for shocks to export
productivity and demand, we dene the margins of trade at the product-destination
level. The intensive margin corresponds to rm export ows of a given product to a given
destination, that were active, both, in the Pre and Post periods. The extensive margin
corresponds to the number of rms that enter or exit a product-destination market. In the
baseline specications, we dene products at the 4-digit level according to the Harmonized
System (HS). As a result, our estimations are obtained from exports variation within close
to 6,000 product-destinations.
Table 4 presents the decomposition of export growth during the Pre and Post periods
along these margins. Export growth declined over 33 percentage points between the Pre
and Post periods. Most of this decline is due to the change in the price of Peruvian
exports. The decline in the growth of export volume was 12.8 percentage points. One
third of this decline is explained by the drop in the intensive margin, and two thirds are
explained by the reduction in the number of exporting rms within a product-destination
market. In Subsection 6.1, we use the elasticities estimated next to calculate the fraction
16of this variation that can be attributed to the decline in credit supply.
4.1 Intensive Margin of Exports
This subsection analyzes the eect of a credit supply shock on the volume of exports
of rm-product-destination ows that are active in the two periods, t = fPre;Postg.
Export data are highly seasonal, so we collapse the panel into the two periods to avoid
estimation bias due to serial correlation and seasonality. Thus, Xipdt corresponds to the
sum of the volume of exports (in kilograms) of product p to destination d by rm i in the
period t, and Cit corresponds to the average outstanding debt balance (in local currency)
of rm i in period t.
We estimate equation (3) by rst-dierencing to eliminate the rm-product-destination
xed eects. The resulting estimation equation is:
ln(XipdPost)   ln(XipdPre) = 
0
pd +   [ln(CiPost)   ln(CiPre)] + "
0
ipd (6)
The product-destination dummies, 0
pd = pdPost   pdPre in equation (3), absorb all
demand uctuations of product p in destination d.
The rst stage coecient |i.e., a linear regression of credit of rms i at time t (Cit)
on the instrument (Fit){ is shown in column 1, Panel 1 of Table 5. The coecient is
negative and signicant at the 1% level, which conrms that the instrument is correlated
with the amount of credit (t = 8:6 and F = 74:4).
The results of the Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation of the export elasticity to
credit supply in specication (6) are presented in Table 5, column 3. The IV estimate
implies that a 10% reduction in the stock of credit results in a decline of 2.3% in the
volume of yearly export ows (Panel 1). We obtain elasticity estimates of the same
magnitude if we dene export markets at the 6-digit level, according to the Harmonized
17System (see Panel 2 in Table 5). Following the example above, this further disaggregation
implies comparing rms' exports of Men's Cotton Overcoats, instead of Men's Overcoats.
This robustness suggests that the estimated magnitude of the elasticity is not driven by
measurement error or unaccounted for variation in export shocks at narrower product
markets.
This nding provides a novel insight regarding the usage of credit by exporting rms.
Existing theoretical models of nance and trade, in which rms use credit to nance
sunk cost of entry in new exports markets, cannot account for a positive intensive margin
elasticity. In such frameworks, a credit shock should not aect the volume of exports for
those rms already exporting a given product to a recurrent destination. Our ndings
suggest that credit frictions aect the variable cost of the rm {i.e., the nancial cost of
working capital. Then, adverse credit supply shocks increase the marginal cost and result
in a reduction in the equilibrium size of the export ow.
The IV estimate of the export elasticity to nance is considerably larger than the
OLS estimate. The downward bias of the OLS estimate implies that (non-credit) shocks
to exports are negatively correlated with changes in the demand for credit. This can
occur, for example, because a collapse in the prices and demand for a rm's exports
reduces substantially the cash ows generated by the rm internally through revenues.
To substitute for this decline in internally generated cash, the rm's demand for external
nance increases.18
4.2 Extensive Margin of Exports
We analyze the eect of a credit supply shock on the number of exporting rms within
given product-destination market. We separately estimate the number of rms entering
and continuing exporting to a given market. To count the number of entering and con-
18The OLS estimate is also likely aected by attenuation bias, given that the regression is in dierences
and it includes a large number of xed eects (see Arellano (2003))
18tinuing rms, we aggregate the data at the group-product-destination level, where group
refers to a classication of rms into two groups (G = f1;0g) according to their exposure
to credit shocks: those with at least 50% of their debt with exposed banks (group G = 1)
and those with most of their debt with non exposed banks (group G = 0). Then we
estimate the following equation:







To study the entry margin, we use as the left-hand side variable the number of rms in
group G that start exporting product p to destination d at time t, for t = fPre;Postg
(NE
Gpdt). To study the continuation margin, we use the number of rms in group G that
were exporting product p to destination d at time t   1 and continue doing so in time t,
for t = fPre;Postg (NC
Gpdt).
As in the previous subsection, we collapse the time series into two periods, Pre and
Post, which correspond to the 12 months before and after July 2008. There is a large
number of intermittent export ows in the sample; thus, we consider a rm-product-
destination ow to be active at time t if it registered positive exports at any time during
those 12 months. The right-hand side variable of interest, credit, is now also dened
at the group-product-destination level: it is the log sum of (average) debts outstanding
for all rms in group G at time t, ln(
P
i2G Cit). Similar to the instrument denition in
equation (5), we instrument debt of rms in group G with a function FGt that predicts
the credit supply to the rms in group G based on the external dependence of its related
banks: FGt = 1 if Fit = 1 for i 2 G (rms with at least 50% of their debt in exposed
banks) and zero otherwise.
We include product-destination-time dummies, pdt, that control for changes in de-
mand and productivity. This specication diers from the one in (6) in that the unit of
observation is dened at the group-product-destination level. The xed eects Gpd con-
19trol for any time-invariant heterogeneity of exports of product p to destination d by rms
in group G, instead of controlling at the rm-product-destination level as in specication
(6).
We estimate the parameter  after rst dierencing equation (7) to eliminate the






The entry margin results are presented in Table 5, column 6, for product denition
at the 4 and 6 digit level, according to the Harmonized System. The elasticity of the
entry margin to credit is positive but not statistically signicant. Column 8 shows the
continuation margin results. According to our preferred specication, using product de-
nition aggregated at 4-digit level (Panel 1), a 10% increase in the stock of credit increases
the number of rms continuing exporting a given product-destination ow in 3.6%. The
estimate of the continuation elasticity drops from 0.36 to 0.275 when export markets are
dened at the 6-digit HS level (Panel 2). This potentially reects that the misclassi-
cation of exports into categories is more likely with highly disaggregated product data.
Such misclassication can have a rst order eect on measurement error of the extensive
margin of trade (see Armenter and Koren (2010) for a discussion). Therefore, the con-
tinuation elasticity using 6-digit product categorizations is potentially biased downwards
due to classical attenuation bias.
These results allow us to infer the existence of xed costs of exporting. We estab-
lished in the previous subsection that credit shocks aect the intensive margin of exports:
a negative credit shock reduces the size of export ows. If exports are also characterized
by a xed cost, this contraction induces rms to abandon markets when sales drop below
the minimum level required for the activity to be protable. Consistent with this inter-
pretation, we nd in unreported regressions that the continuation elasticity is larger for
rm-product-destination ows below the median volume size, which are more likely to
20drop the break even point. The point estimates for the continuation elasticity is are 0.54
and 0.15 for small and large export ows respectively, and the dierence is signicant at
the 10% level.
4.3 Eect on Freight Characteristics and Trade Credit
Firms may adjust other dimensions of the trade activity when subject to a negative credit
shock. In this subsection we explore the eect of a decline in the availability of bank
funding on freight policies and the trade credit conditions with the importer. We estimate
specications parallel to (6) using the following left-hand side variables: (i) frequency
of shipments for a rm-product-destination export ow during period t (ShipFreqipdt);
(ii) average size of shipments (in volume) for a given export ow during the period t
(ShipV olipdt); (iii) the fraction of the annual ow (value FOB) transported by air, as
opposed to sea and ground, (FracAiripdt); and (iv) the fraction of the annual ow (value
FOB) paid in advance by the importer (FracCashipdt).
The results are presented in Table 6. A negative shock to credit supply is found to
reduce the frequency of shipments, with elasticity 0.14, signicant at the 1% level (column
1). The elasticity of average shipment size is also positive but not statistically signicant
(column 2). These estimates suggest the existence of xed costs of exporting at the
shipment level. A large per-shipment cost together with a low variable cost imply that
the frequency of shipments will be more elastic to a credit shock than their size, consistent
with our results.
Credit supply is also found to inuence the choice of transportation mode. The pref-
erence for aerial transportation increases with the availability of credit: a 1% increase in
credit supply rises the fraction of exports shipped by air in 0.02% (column 3). This indi-
cates that, holding the product and the destination constant, rms endogenously choose
the transportation mode and that negative credit shocks induce rms to shift from using
21expensive (and fast) transportation modes to slower (and cheaper) ones.
Finally, the fraction of the transaction value paid in advance by the importer is not
sensitive to the decline in credit supply (column 4). That is, the credit arrangements
between the exporter and the importer do not appear to react to funding shocks to
the exporting rm. This result relates to Antras and Foley (2011), who document the
stickiness of the terms of trade credit contracts between established trade partners during
the 2008 nancial crisis.
5 Characterization of the Eect of Credit on Exports
In this section we analyze how the elasticity of exports to credit shocks varies according
to observable characteristics of the export ow, the exporting rms, and the product.
This analysis allows us to make inferences regarding the role of external nancing in the
activities of the rm.
5.1 Role of Credit in Export Activities
The results in the previous section provide strong evidence for the existence of xed
cost of exporting. Substantial xed exporting costs can make exports more sensitive to
credit than domestic sales, as changes in the exporter's availability of credit may trigger
discontinuous changes in exports. Furthermore, international trade is characterized by
longer freight times and, thus, longer cash cycles than domestic sales. If export-related
working capital represents a large fraction of the overall working capital of the rm, it is
possible that the elasticity of export activities to credit is larger than that of domestic
sales.
We explore the importance of the export-related working capital of the rm by analyz-
ing how the sensitivity of exports to credit varies with the cash-cycle length of the export
22ow and with the trade credit arrangements between the importer and the exporter; i.e.,
whether the importer or the exporter nances the transaction.19 We measure the length
of the cash-cycle in two alternative ways: distance to destination market and freight speed
(ground and sea versus air); the results are presented in Table 7. The elasticities of, both,
the intensive and extensive margins of exports do not vary for export ows destined to
markets located beyond the median distance (column 1, 4, and 5), or whether the export
ow was shipped by air (as oppose to by sea or ground) in the Pre period (column 2 and
6). Furthermore, columns 3 and 7 show that the elasticities of the intensive and continu-
ation margins do not dier for those export ows paid in advance by the importer (Cash)
in the Pre period. Overall, our results do not support the hypothesis that export-specic
nancing requirements have a rst order eect on the magnitude of the elasticity. Instead,
the sensitivity to credit appears to emerge from the general working capital requirements
by the rm, which becomes costlier after a negative credit shock.
5.2 Firm Heterogeneity in Access to Credit
Changes in a bank's supply of credit aect the outcomes of related rms to the the extent
that these rms cannot nd alternative sources of funding. Then, dierences across rms
in their access to nance translate into heterogeneous elasticity to bank credit. We analyze
how the elasticity of exports to bank credit varies across two rm dimensions: membership
of a multinational enterprise, which potentially provides the rm with access to funding
from internal capital markets, and the number of banking relationships, which potentially
allows the rm to substitute among bank funding sources at a lower cost.
In Table 8 we report the results of estimating equations (6) and (7) augmented with
an interaction between all the right-hand side variables with a dummy that equals one
whenever the exporting rm is an aliate of a foreign owned multinational (Panel 1) and
19We do not have data on total production or the domestic sales of the rm.
23a dummy that equals one when the exporter obtains credit from more than one bank on
the Pre period (Panel 2). The point estimates of the elasticities on the intensive and
extensive margin indicate that exports by foreign aliates are not sensitive to local bank
credit (the intensive margin estimate is not statistically signicant, however). Having
multiple banking relationships, on the other hand, is not found to aect the elasticity of
the intensive or extensive margin of exports to a credit shock.
5.3 Sectorial Heterogeneity in Credit Intensity
Since the seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (1998), heterogeneity in the degree of
external nance dependence across sectors has been widely used to identify the eect
of credit constraints on long-term growth and the cross country pattern of international
trade. It remains to be shown whether the same factors that aect the sensitivity of
exports to long-term nance can also predict the eect of short-term credit shocks. This
subsection explores this question.
We analyze how our estimates of the export elasticities to credit shocks vary across
sectors with dierent external nance dependence. Our measure of external nance de-
pendence follows Chor and Manova (2010); it corresponds to the fraction of total capital
expenditure not nanced by internal cash ows based on cross sectoral data of U.S. rms.
This measure is considered to represent technological characteristics of the sector the rm
belongs to. For example, according to this measure, textile mills that transform basic
bers into fabric, intensively require external nance, while apparel manufacturing rms
that process that fabric into the nal piece of clothing, are considered to be less dependent.
We report in Table 9, Panel 1, the result of estimating equations (6) and (7) aug-
mented with an interaction between all the right-hand side variables with a dummy that
equals one if the product belongs to an industry with above median external nancial
dependence. The point estimates on the interaction term are negative in all specica-
24tions, and signicantly dierent than zero in the continuation margin. This indicates
that the elasticity of the intensive margin of exports to credit shocks does not vary across
sectors with dierent levels of external nance dependence. The continuation margin is
less elastic for sectors with a high external nance dependence.
Our results suggest that the elasticities to short-term and long-term changes in -
nancial conditions capture dierent aspects of the rm's use of credit. The measure of
external nance dependence may indicate the sensitivity of the rm to long term credit
conditions, which is potentially related to the presence of important xed investments or
entry costs. The elasticity of exports to credit shocks, on the other hand, appears to be
related to the short term needs of working capital.
Cross sectoral analysis on the impact of credit shocks on exports often uses, as indicator
of the sector reliance to short term credit, the average usage of trade credit |i.e. the
sector average ratio of the change in accounts payable over the change in total assets{
(Chor and Manova (2010)). Panel 2 of Table 9 shows how the elasticities estimated in
the previous section vary for sectors with high share of trade credit. The point estimates
are not statistically signicant.
Finally, we analyze how the sensitivity to credit varies for commodities and dieren-
tiated goods. World exports of these types of goods behave dierently during the 2008
crisis. Although quantities exported drop for all products and countries, their unit values
present interesting dierences: world commodity prices collapse while prices of dieren-
tiated goods do not (see Haddad, Harrison and Hausman (2010)). Credit constraints in
the dierentiated sector, by negatively aecting supply of exports, can rationalize this
pattern. We explore this hypothesis by comparing the elasticity for homogeneous and
dierentiated goods, following the product classication in Rauch (1999). The point esti-
mates in Panel 3 of Table 9 are consistent with this hypothesis. For homogenous goods,
the continuation margin is signicantly less sensitive to credit. In the case of the intensive
25margin, however, the estimation is too noisy to be conclusive.20
6 Credit and Non-Credit Determinants of Exports
In this section we use the estimated elasticities to perform a back of the envelope calcula-
tion of the contribution of nance to the overall export decline during the the 2008 crisis
and perform analysis of the potential biases that arise when estimating the contribution
of nance shock to output uctuations when non-credit factors (i.e., demand and price
shocks) are ignored in the econometric specication.
6.1 Contribution of Credit Shock on Overall Export Decline
Our estimates are obtained from relative changes in credit by exposed versus non-exposed
banks. Thus, to obtain a back of the envelope calculation of the overall eect of the credit
shock to rms on the total exports decline we must make an assumption about the change
in credit supply of non-exposed banks |i.e. banks with a share of foreign liabilities
below 9.5%{. We make the simplifying assumption that credit supply of non-exposed
banks is constant throughout the analysis period. This assumption produces conservative
estimates of the overall eect of credit if non-exposed banks also reduced credit supply
during the crisis. The contrary occurs if non-exposed banks expanded credit supply to
substitute for the unfullled demand by exposed banks.
The estimates in Table 3 imply that exposed banks reduced credit supply by 16.8%
relative to not-exposed banks. Exposed banks account for 30.5% of total credit to ex-
porters in the Pre period (12 months before July 2008). Given the above assumption,
these estimates imply that total credit supply dropped by 5.1%. For the intensive margin
elasticity we use the estimate of 0.23 from Table 5, and for the continuation margin we
20Since less than 10% of Peruvian export ows involves dierentiated products, this estimation is
particularly noisy.
26use the estimate of 0.15, which characterizes the elasticity of large export ows (small
export ows account only for 2% of total exports). The elasticity of the entry margin is
not statistically signicant in most specications, so we set it to zero for the calculation.
These assumptions imply that the drop in credit supply to Peruvian rms can explain a
1.9% reduction in the volume of exports during the 12 months following July 2008 (Post
period). We note that this estimate captures the eect of a negative credit supply shock on
the supply of exports by Peruvian rms; they do not reect the eect of nancial frictions
outside Peru and their potential eect on the foreign demand for Peruvian exports.
Compared to the total drop in the annual growth rate of the volume of exports between
the Pre and Post periods, 12.8 percentage points (see Table 4), this estimate implies that
the credit shock can account for approximately 15% of the missing volume of trade. When
we look separately at the intensive, entry and exit margins, the credit shock can account
for 27%, 0% and 9% of each margin, respectively. This suggests that the bulk of the
export decline during the 12 months following July 2008 was triggered by the contraction
in international demand for Peruvian exports, and this was particularly true regarding
rms' decisions to enter or to continue supplying product-destination markets.
6.2 Estimation Bias
Recent work studying real eects of the bank transmission channel during crises has
been constrained by data limitations to studying rm level outcomes, such as total sales,
total exports, or investment (see for example Amiti and Weinstein (2009), Carvalho,
Ferreira and Matos (2010), Iyer et al. (2010), Jimenez et al. (2011a), Kalemli-Ozcan,
Kamil and Villegas-Sanchez (2010)). The typical empirical strategy compares outcomes
of rms related to banks that are dierentially aected by the crisis. In this subsection
we compute the bias that arises when we aggregate the data at the rm level and use it to
obtain a dierence-in-dierences estimate that compares the change in average exports by
27rms borrowing from exposed banks relative to rms borrowing from non-exposed banks
(parallel to the reduced form estimates in the above mentioned studies). This approach
provides an unbiased reduced form estimate of the bank transmission channel if banks and
rms are randomly matched. If, on the contrary, rms related to exposed banks specialize
in certain products or destinations, then estimates based on comparing the outcomes of
rms related to exposed and non exposed banks confound the eect of the lending channel
with the heterogeneous impact of the crisis across products and destinations.
In Table 11, column 1, we present the naive dierence-in-dierences reduced form
estimate (with rm xed eects), and in column 2, the reduced form version of equation
(6), which controls for shocks at the product-destination level.21 The naive dierence-in-
dierences estimator overestimates the reduced form eect of the credit shock on exports
during the 2008 crisis by 95%. This overestimation of the overall eect on credit on
exports combines two amplifying eects. First, not accounting for non-credit related
factors aecting the product and destination markets introduces a bias in the estimation
of the elasticity of exports of 66% (columns 3 and 4). And second, the magnitude of the
credit supply shock is overestimated when not controlling for the rm's change in credit
demand (as we do in the within-rm estimation in equation 4).
This nding implies that rms and banks are not randomly matched. In particular,
exposed banks specialize in destinations that are disproportionately aected by the -
nancial crisis.22 It also implies that when non-nance shocks at the product-destination
level are unaccounted for, the overall importance of credit shocks in explaining output
uctuations can be severely overestimated. In the present case, the bias would lead to
conclude erroneously that credit shocks explained twice as much of the Peruvian export
21The reduced form is the regression of exports on the instrument. Intuitively, the dierence in export
growth to a product-destination market by rms related by exposed and non-exposed banks, controlling
for shocks at the product-destination level.
22The bias is largest when there are no controls for changes in export demand across destination
markets.
28decline during the Great Trade Collapse than they actually did.
These results also call for caution when deriving conclusions regarding the importance
of credit in explaining output uctuations based on comparisons across sectors or destina-
tions. For example, conclusions regarding the specic usage of credit by export activities
often rely on comparing the eect of a credit shock on the rm's sales across destinations;
i.e., domestic versus foreign sales, or across foreign destinations with dierent freight
time. These comparisons may confound the eect of the credit shock on exports with the
heterogeneous impact of the crisis across markets.
7 Identication and Robustness Tests
As mentioned in Section 3, the elasticity estimates will be biased if rms associated with
banks with high foreign liabilities experience a disproportionate negative shock to exports
relative to other rms exporting to the same product-destination for reasons other than
bank credit. This could occur, for example, if rms that borrow from exposed banks
export products of a higher quality (within the same 4 or 6 digit HS code), and the
demand for higher quality products dropped more during the crisis. It would also occur
if rms with high foreign currency denominated liabilities borrow from banks with high
foreign liabilities, and the capital ow reversals aect the balance sheet of rms directly
and not through bank lending. In this section we perform identication tests to account
for potential shocks correlated with bank aliation. We also test the robustness of the
results to the denition of the instrument.
In the rst identication test we estimate the export elasticity in the intensive margin
measuring exports in dollar FOB values. If price changes faced by rms exporting to
the same market are orthogonal to their bank aliation, then the product-destination
dummies should absorb these eects resulting in the same estimates of export elasticities
if measured in volume or value. The result in Panel 1 in Table 10 conrms that the volume
29and value elasticities are of the same order of magnitude and statistically indistinguishable.
An alternative way to test for unaccounted shocks correlated with bank aliation
is to explicitly control for them. In the second identication test we augment equation
(6) with a set of observable rm characteristics in the Pre period as control variables:
average unit price of exports at the rm-product-destination level, average fraction of
debt denominated in foreign currency, total exports, number of products, and number
of destinations at the rm level. Including these pre-determined variables in the rst
dierenced specication is equivalent to including them interacted with time dummies
in the panel specication of equation (3). Thus, this augmented specication controls
for heterogeneity in the evolution of exports after the crisis along the product quality,
rm external exposure, and rm size dimensions. The elasticities of, both, the intensive
and extensive margins of exports (in Panel 2, Table 10) are virtually identical to those
computed without controls.
In the third identication test we explore the possibility that rms associated with
exposed banks were simply on a dierent export and borrowing growth path before the
crisis. If this were the case, our estimates could be capturing such pre-existing dierences
across the two groups of rms and not the eect of the credit shock. We perform the
following placebo test: we estimate equation (6) lagging the debt and export measures
one year, as if the capital ow reversals had occurred in 2007 instead of 2008. That is,
for t = fPre   1;Preg, where Pre is, as above, the period July 2007-July 2008, and
Pre   1 corresponds to the previous 12 months. The elasticities of both the intensive
and extensive margin of exports, reported in Panel 3 of Table 10, are not statistically
dierent from zero. This conrms that rms borrowing from banks with a high share of
foreign liabilities as of December 2007 did not face any dierential credit supply prior to
the crisis. And, correspondingly, their exports performance was not dierent from those
of rms linked to banks with a low share of foreign liabilities.
30Finally, we test the robustness of the results to the denition of the instrument. First,
we vary the cross-sectional denition of the instrument by substituting the indicator
variable Fi with a continuous function, dened as the maximum fraction of total funding
that rm i obtained from exposed banks during 2006. The results, qualitatively and
quantitatively similar to those described above, are presented in Panel 4 of Table 10.23
Second, we verify that the results are not sensitive to the exact denition of the Pre and
Post periods. In our baseline regressions, we dene the initial month of the Post period,
July 2008, based on the evolution of foreign capital inows in Peru. But the 2008 nancial
crisis does not have an objective start date and domestic banks may have anticipated the
capital ow reversals after the collapse of Bearn Stearns and the increase in international
nancial volatility in March 2008. We therefore set April 2008 as an alternative start of
the Post period. We obtain point estimates of 0.25 for the intensive margin elasticity
and 0.65 for the continuation elasticity. This last estimate, although larger than the one
reported in Table 5, is noisily estimated (s.d. 0.33) and the dierence is not statistically
signicant. Again, the elasticity of the entry margin is not statistically dierent from
zero.
Overall, the results in in this section suggest that our empirical approach obtains
unbiased estimated of the elasticity of exports to credit. In other words, after conditioning
on product-destination shocks to exports, a rm's aliation to a bank with a high share
of foreign liabilities is orthogonal to other non-credit determinants of exports.
8 Conclusions
It has long been argued that funding shocks to the banking sector are transmitted to
the credit availability of non-nancial rms. Existing evidence on whether these shocks
23The rst stage (non-reported) for this continuum function is stronger than the baseline instrument,
with t=10.8 and F=115.5.
31have consequences on real outcomes in inconclusive, however. In this paper, we provide
evidence of this link in the context of international trade. The main advantage of exploring
the real consequences of bank credit supply shocks under the lens of international trade
is that detailed customs data allows accounting for price and demand shocks at a highly
disaggregated product markets. Another advantage of disaggregated data is that they
allow characterizing the channel through which credit supply uctuations impact output.
Our results stem from analyzing Peruvian exports during the 2008 international crisis.
Although Peru was not directly aected by the collapse in the value of U.S. real estate, the
capital ow reversal during the international nancial crisis aected the lending capacity
of domestic commercial banks. We use this drop in the supply of credit to Peruvian rms
to estimate the sensitivity of exports to credit.
We nd that a 10% reduction in the supply of credit results in a contraction of 2.3%
in the (one year) volume of export ows for those rm-product-destination ows active
before and after the crisis. This result indicates that credit shocks aect the variable cost
of exporting. On the extensive margin, a negative credit supply shock reduces the number
of rms that continue exporting to a given market. This extensive margin sensitivity is
consistent with a xed cost of exporting: rms that suer a negative credit shock stop
exporting to markets that drop below the minimum size to cover it. Credit shocks are also
found to aect the frequency and freight method (air versus ground and sea) of shipments,
but not the shipment size. These ndings suggest the existence of a xed cost of exporting
at the shipment level.
The existence of xed cost of exporting makes international trade more sensitive to
credit than domestic sales, as changes in the exporter's availability of credit may trigger
discontinuous changes in exports due to uctuations in the number of active export ows.
However, our results suggest that export-related working capital does not represent a
substantial fraction of the total working capital of the rm: the sensitivity of exports to
32credit does not change with the determinants of export cash-cycle length (i.e., distance to
destination market, mode of transportation, and existence of trade credit by the importer).
This suggests that the intensive margin of exports is not more sensitive to credit than
domestic sales through the working capital channel.
Overall, the results in this paper show that credit has a rst order eect on the volume
of exports. However, the largest determinant of the Peruvian exports collapse during the
2008 crisis is related to non-credit factors (e.g., international demand and prices). In
our context, failure to control for determinants of exports other than bank credit at the
product-destination level leads to severely biased estimates when studying the eect of
a contraction in credit on trade. Our results suggest that estimates that rely on more
aggregated data (e.g., outcomes at the rm or sector levels) should be interpreted with
caution during crisis episodes, which have potentially large and heterogeneous real eects
across sectors and countries.
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Source: Bank nancial statements, Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros de Peru. For-
eign nancing: bank liabilities with institutions outside Peru.
Figure 2: Total Banking Sector Foreign Financing
38All Commercial Banks High Foreign Exposure Low Foreign Exposure
(N = 13) (N = 4) (N = 9)
mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50
Assets (M US$) 2,778 4,175 753 2,533 3,817 794 2,887 4,543 753
Loans (M US$) 1,668 2,379 507 1,709 2,575 562 1,650 2,451 507
Deposits (M US$) 1,979 3,060 465 1,681 2,682 436 2,112 3,359 465
Foreign Financing (M US$) 256 400 71 353 507 121 212 370 52
Loans/Assets 0.661 0.105 0.673 0.659 0.126 0.660 0.661 0.103 0.673
Deposits/Assets 0.637 0.142 0.691 0.573 0.082 0.543 0.665 0.158 0.733
Foreign Financing/Assets 0.095 0.101 0.068 0.196 0.135 0.175 0.050 0.034 0.065
Source: Bank nancial statements as of December 2007, Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros
de Peru.
Table 1: Commercial Bank Descriptive Statistics
39All Exporters Analysis Sample: Positive Debt after June 2008
Full Subsample Borrows > 50% from Aected Banks
Yes No
mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50 mean sd p50
Panel 1: Firms Statistics (N = 6,169) (N=4,974) (N = 1,471) (N=3,503)
Debt (1,000 US$) 1,013 6,903 1.45 1,253 7,668 9.58 2,076 11,794 118.30 907 4970 0.37
# Lenders 1.70 1.10 1.10 1.75 1.12 1.19 2.03 1.10 1.76 1.57 1.10 1.00
Fraction Dollar Debt 0.708 0.385 0.951 0.713 0.381 0.953 0.780 0.333 0.982 0.659 0.408 0.918
Exports - FOB (1,000 US$) 3,348 52,721 28 4,005 58,478 31 4,487 41,066 101 3,802 64,405 20
Exports (1,000 Kg) 8,466 230,071 11 10,371 256,182 12 6,004 43,503 39 12,204 303,959 8
# destinations 2.7 4.3 1.0 2.9 4.5 1.0 3.6 5.3 2.0 2.5 4.1 1.0
# products (4-digit) 5.3 9.4 2.0 4.7 8.2 2.0 4.6 7.2 2.0 4.7 8.6 2.0
> 50% debt in exposed bank 0.248 0.432 0.000 0.296 0.456 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dummy=1 if multinational 0.036 0.040 0.065 0.030
Fraction debt in exposed bank 0.247 0.398 0.000 0.295 0.417 0.000 0.910 0.149 1.000 0.036 0.109 0.000
Panel 2: Firms-Product-Destination Statistics (N = 53,690) (N=47,810) (N = 13,339) (N=34,471)
Value - FOB (1,000 US$) 169.3 3,675.6 0.7 184.8 3,875.5 0.8 208.1 4,198.9 2.7 175.7 3,743.0 0.4
Volume (1,000 Kg) 401.7 22,112.8 0.1 446.4 23,432.3 0.1 280.8 3,143.1 0.5 510.4 27,526.6 0.1
Distance (km) 6,521 7,986 5,587 6,518 8,005 5,587 6,497 8,727 4,725 6,526 7,708 5,587
Paid in advance - FOB (1,000 US$) 42.2 1,764.5 0.0 46.3 1,869.6 0.0 34.6 432.4 0.0 50.8 2,185.3 0.0
Transported by Air - FOB (1,000 USx) 37.2 2,181.9 0.0 40.8 2,311.6 0.0 84.4 4,027.6 0.0 24.0 1,064.7 0.0
Shipment Value - FOB (1,000 USx) 32.8 470.2 0.5 36.0 497.1 0.5 39.7 488.6 1.6 34.6 508.4 0.3
Shipment Volume (1,000 kg) 77.5 2,203.1 0.1 86.1 2,334.4 0.1 64.2 529.2 0.3 94.5 2,729.4 0.1
# Shipments per year 2.23 2.19 1.00 2.17 2.15 1.00 2.51 2.43 1.00 2.04 2.02 1.0
Dummy=1 if multinational 0.085 0.092 0.143 0.072
Source: Customs data from SUNAT, credit registry data from the Superintendencia de Bancos y Seguros de Peru. Sample: rms with at least one
export registered between July 2007 and June 2009. The statistics are estimated over the calendar year July 2007-June 2008.
Table 2: Firm Descriptive Statistics
4
0Dependent Variable lnCib
All Debt US Dollar Local Currency
Denominated Denominated
(1) (2) (3)
FDb -0.168*** -0.241*** 0.161**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.076)
Firm FE yes yes yes
Observations 10,334 8,433 6,515
R2 0.630 0.634 0.650
R2 adj 0.261 0.250 0.102
# banks 41 33 39
# rms 5,154 4,320 3,977
Estimation of equation (4). FDb is a dummy that signals whether foreign liabilities of bank
b is above the median. Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, in parenthesis.
p < 0:01, p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 3: Transmission of Credit Shocks by Banks with High Foreign Dependence
41Value (FOB) Volume (kg)
t=Pre t=Post t=Pre t=Post
Total 10.9% -22.4% 3.2% -9.6%
Intensive 10.6% -15.7% 2.1% -2.2%
Extensive 0.3% -6.6% 1.2% -7.4%
Entry 8.4% 8.2% 8.6% 8.3%
Exit -8.1% -14.8% -7.4% -15.7%
Source: SUNAT. Extensive and intensive margins dened at the level of product desti-
nation ows. For each t = fPre;Postg, it corresponds to the growth rate Xt=Xt 1   1.
Each time t is a 12 months period and Pre and Post periods correspond to the 12 months
before and after July 2008. A ow rm-product-destination is considered active at time
t if exports were positive at any time during the period. Product denition aggregated
at 4-digit level according to the Harmonized System.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Export Growth
42Intensive Margin Extensive Margin





FS OLS IV FS OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel 1: Products dened at 4-digit HS






i2G Ci) 0.031** 0.232 0.015 0.363***
(0.015) (0.185) (0.013) (0.095)
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,208 14,209 14,210 9,153 4,495 3,916 6,114 5,827
# Product-Destination 5,997 5,997 5,997 6,995 3,564 3,088 4,866 4,658
R2 0.360 0.438 0.797 0.770 0.788
Panel 2: Products dened at 6-digit HS






i2G Ci) 0.046** 0.594 0.018 0.275***
(0.019) (0.435) (0.015) (0.065)
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,472 16,472 16,472 12,285 5,212 4,512 7,668 7,302
# Product-Destination 8,567 8,567 8,567 10,004 4,330 3,739 6,421 6,143
R2 0.447 0.528 0.845 0.801 0.806
Estimation of equations (6) and (7). In the IV regression, the change in (log of) credit, ln Ci
(ln(
P
i2G Ci)), is instrumented with Fi (FG), a dummy that takes value 1 if the rm (rms in group
G) borrows more than 50% from an exposed bank. Standard errors clustered at the product-destination
level in parenthesis. p < 0:01, p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 5: Export Elasticity to Credit Shocks
43Dependent Variable: ln(ShipFreqipd) ln(ShipV olipd) FracAiripd FracCashipd
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Ci) 0.140*** 0.087 0.018* 0.004
(0.030) (0.054) (0.010) (0.016)
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,208 14,208 14,208 14,208
IV estimation of equation (6). Dependent variable in column 1 is the (log of) frequency of
shipments; in column 2 is the (log of) average size of shipments (in volume); in columns 3 and
4, it is the change in the fraction of annual export ows (FOB) transported by air and paid in
advanced by the importer, respectively. Change in (log of) credit, lnCi (ln(
P
i2G Ci)), is
instrumented with Fi (FG), a dummy that takes value 1 if the rm (rms in group G) borrows
more than 50% from an exposed bank. Standard errors clustered at the product-destination
level in parenthesis. p < 0:01, p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 6: Eect of Credit on Export Arrangements
44Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Dependent Variable: lnXipd lnNE
Gpd lnNC
Gpd
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnCi 0.283*** 0.220** 0.234***
(0.063) (0.109) (0.080)
lnCi  (distd > dist) -0.226
(0.194)
lnCi  Airipd 0.054
(0.132)




i2G Ci) 0.358 0.394** 0.206** 0.589*
(0.301) (0.163) (0.080) (0.312)
ln(
P








i2G Ci)  Cashipd -0.313
(0.327)
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,146 14,208 14,208 2,788 6,281 6,259 6,601
IV estimations of equations (6) and (7). Change in (log of) credit, lnCi (ln(
P
i2G Ci)),
instrumented with Fi (FG), a dummy that takes value 1 if the rm (rms in group G) borrows
more than 50% from an exposed bank. Credit is interacted with the following dummies:
(distd > dist) = 1 if distance to market of destination is above the median, Airipd = 1 if
shipment was by air, and Cashipd = 1 if a fraction of the transaction was payed in advanced
by the importer. Standard errors clustered at the product-destination level in parenthesis.
p < 0:01, p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 7: Elasticities by Export Flow Characteristics
45`
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin




Panel 1: Foreign Ownership
lnCi 0.263**
(0.069)








i2G Ci)  Foreigni2G -0.466 -0.538***
(0.630) (0.194)
#Banks-Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,208 3,640 6,240
Panel 2: Multiple Banking Relationships
lnCi 0.145**
(0.067)








i2G Ci)  ManyBanksi2G -0.303 3.253
(0.271) (6.958)
#Banks-Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,208 2,444 5,618
IV estimations of equations (6) and (7). Change in (log of) credit, lnCi (ln(
P
i2G Ci)),
instrumented with Fi (FG), a dummy that takes value 1 if the rm (rms in group G) borrows
more than 50% from an exposed bank. Credit is interacted with dummy Foreigni that takes
value 1 if the rm is a subsidiary of a foreign rm, and ManyBanksi that takes value 1 if
the number of banks that lend to the rm is larger than the median. Panel Standard errors
clustered at the product-destination level in parenthesis. p < 0:01, p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 8: Elasticity by Firm Characteristics
46Intensive Margin Extensive Margin




Panel 1: External Finance Dependence
ln(Ci) 0.211**
(0.083)








i2G Ci)  HighFinDepp -1.842 -0.469*
(6.615) (0.257)
Observations 12,652 3,561 5,246
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel 2: Trade Credit
ln(Ci) 0.200***
(0.075)








i2G Ci)  HighTradeCreditp -1.378 0.030
(6.950) (0.213)
Observations 14,208 3,561 5,246
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes
Panel 3: Product Dierentiation
ln(Ci) 0.208***
(0.069)








i2G Ci)  Homogeneousp -0.091 -0.432**
(0.237) (0.181)
Observations 13,537 3,667 5,517
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes
IV estimation of equations (6) and (7). The change in (log of) credit, lnCi
(ln(
P
i2G Ci)), is instrumented with Fi (FG), a dummy that takes value 1 if the rm
(rms in group G) borrows more than 50% from an exposed bank. The classication of
sectors according to their dependence of external nance and share of tangible assets fol-
lows Chor and Manova (2010). Denition of homogeneous products is from Rauch (1999).
Standard errors clustered at the product-destination level in parenthesis. p < 0:01,
p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 9: Elasticity by Product Characteristic
47Intensive Margin Extensive Margin













i2G Ci) 0.473 0.394***
(0.337) (0.122)
lnX -0.041** 0.153 -0.004
(0.017) (0.156) (0.012)
ln dollar debt 0.135* -0.061 -0.019
(0.069) (0.119) (0.031)
unit price 0.000 0.390* -0.017
(0.000) (0.213) (0.039)
ln # products 0.002 1.096 -0.023
(0.020) (1.030) (0.125)
ln # destinations 0.057* 0.000 -0.000
(0.034) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 14,024 3,088 5,827





i2G Ci) 0.476 -0.180
(0.299) (0.318)
Observations 15,265 4,003 5,990





i2G Ci) 0.232 0.327***
(0.185) (0.079)
Observations 14,210 3,916 5,827
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes
IV estimations of (6) and (7). In Panel 1, exports measured in US$ FOB. Panel 2 adds the following
controls: overall volume of export, fraction of dollar debt, unit price of exports, # products exported,
and # destinations. For intensive margin, controls are at rm level; for extensive margin they correspond
to group average. In Panel 3, t = fPre 1;Preg, where Pre = June 2007-July 2008 and Pre 1 = June
2006-July 2007. In Panel 4, lnCi instrumented with Fi: (max) proportion of rm debt in exposed
banks. Standard errors clustered at the product-destination level in parenthesis. p < 0:01, p < 0:05,
and p < 0:1
Table 10: Identication Tests
48Reduced Form IV estimation
Dependent Variable: lnXi lnXipd lnXi lnXipd
(1) (2) (3) (4)




Product-Destination FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,438 14,208 2,438 14,210
R2 0.005 0.438
Reduced form and IV estimations of equation (6). The instrument Fi is a dummy that
takes value 1 if the rm borrows more than 50% from an exposed bank. Xi and Xipd are
volume of exports at the rm and rm-product-destination levels, respectively. In column
2 and 4 standard errors are clustered at the product-destination level, in parenthesis.
p < 0:01, p < 0:05, and p < 0:1
Table 11: Estimation Bias
49